Overseas Credit Claiming and Domestic Support for Foreign Aid by Dietrich, S et al.
UC Berkeley
UC Berkeley Previously Published Works
Title
Overseas Credit Claiming and Domestic Support for Foreign Aid
Permalink
https://escholarship.org/uc/item/6s4380ms
Journal
Journal of Experimental Political Science, 6(3)
ISSN
2052-2630
Authors
Dietrich, Simone
Hyde, Susan D
Winters, Matthew S
Publication Date
2019
DOI
10.1017/xps.2019.12
 
Peer reviewed
eScholarship.org Powered by the California Digital Library
University of California
 1 
Everyone was aware that the itinerary was quite artful.  It took the 
ambassador past every agricultural station which the American 
mission had established; the Senator would never be out of sight of 
some sign of American aid.  That he would not be seeing a typical 
countryside disturbed none of these realistic people (Burdick and 
Lederer 1958, 244). 
 
Foreign aid budgets are constantly under pressure (Lancaster 2007; Morgenthau 1962; 
Spencer et al. 2011; Tendler 1975), and public support for foreign aid is generally low (van Heerde 
and Hudson 2010; Page and Shapiro 1992). Even when the donor country public supports the 
ends for which foreign aid is used, they often do not support augmenting the foreign assistance 
budget (e.g. Wojtowicz and Hanania 2017; see also Hurst, Tidwell, and Hawkins 2017; Milner and 
Tingley 2013; Prather 2016; Scotto et al. 2017).  Many aid agencies seek to increase support by 
making aid more observable.  
One strategy is to brand physical manifestations of assistance with the flag, the aid agency 
name and logo, or other donor signifiers. Across the developing world, one finds examples of 
donor credit-claiming both on infrastructure projects, such as health clinics, and at trainings or 
workshops. As public diplomacy, branding activities ostensibly work to make recipients aware of 
the sources of aid (Dietrich, Mahmud, and Winters 2018).  
At home, aid agencies use images of branded aid to publicize projects to domestic audiences. 
Although the reasons for this effort are not consistently articulated, a common argument states 
that if the general public sees taxpayer dollars used to improve the lives of people in poor 
countries, they should support foreign aid more, yet this question has not been investigated 
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empirically. 1 When citizens see images of branded aid, are they more likely to say it is well spent 
and express support for foreign assistance? 
We explore these questions with an original survey experiment on British nationals.  
Respondents receiving branded visual treatments were more likely to identify the donor and 
more likely to think that aid recipients could also identify the donor. In addition, the treatments 
improved perceptions that aid money is “well spent.” Only among conservatives, however, did 
the treatments increase support for the specific aid program, and for this same group, the videos 
decreased overall support for foreign aid relative to a pure control group, an unexpected finding.    
 
Seeing Foreign Aid in Action and Supporting Foreign Assistance 
 Observing a branded foreign aid intervention can provide two kinds of information to donor 
country citizens.  First, if we assume that they view the intervention as helpful, the image can 
demonstrate to them that a beneficial intervention was funded using resources from their home 
country.  Findings in psychology show that helping others and donating money cue a variety of 
positive emotions (e.g. Cain, Dana, and Newman 2014; Crocker, Canevello, and Brown 2017). 
Visual information linking a development project to the donor country could result in positive 
affect toward the project and toward foreign aid in general. 
Second, branding can signal to an individual in a donor country that people in the aid-
receiving country are aware of resources coming from the donor.2  The donor-country citizen 
might believe it is good for people in aid-receiving countries to be aware of the donor’s generosity 
                                                          
1 Political elites could also be a target. 
2 Dietrich, Mahmud, and Winters (2018) examine whether branding conveys this information to aid recipients. 
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because it will improve public opinion toward the donor, bring about economic benefits, or 
reduce security threats. Inferring that branded aid benefits the donor country, the person seeing 
branded aid will become more supportive of aid. 
 In this exploratory study, we exposed donor country citizens to either unbranded or branded 
information about a specific aid intervention.  We expect more positive reactions to foreign aid 
among the set of respondents exposed to branded treatments (H1).3   
As is well known, political conservatives tend to be skeptical of foreign aid for development, 
given their preferences for budget discipline and free markets (Milner and Tingley 2011, 2013; 
Paxton and Knack 2012), but are more likely to advocate for the instrumental use of aid in pursuit 
of the national interest (Fleck and Kilby 2006). These differing ideological preferences exist at the 
level of political parties: while left-leaning parties express more positive foreign aid positions in 
their election manifestos (Dietrich, Milner, and Slapin 2018), conservative parties associate 
foreign aid with the "national interest" (Mawdsley 2017). Given that branding makes aid 
observable and promotes the donor image abroad, we expect positive treatment effects to be 
larger among conservative respondents when aid promotes the national interest (H1a).   
 
Research Design 
We embedded an informational experiment in a survey conducted on a sample of self-
reported British nationals registered with experimental labs at the Universities of Essex, 
Edinburgh, and Oxford in March/April 2016.4  A total of 777 subjects completed the survey: 382 
                                                          
3 We preregistered the study hypotheses with EGAP.  
4 Lab managers recruited online survey respondents through email invitations.  
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student subjects, 382 non-student subjects, and 13 subjects who did not identify their status.5  
Every respondent received a £3 Amazon voucher as compensation.  
The survey began with a set of questions unrelated to foreign aid.  We then indicated that 
the rest of the survey would be about foreign aid and asked three initial questions to gauge 
respondent awareness of foreign aid.   
We randomly assigned respondents to one of five experimental conditions, summarized in 
Table 1.  The first condition was a pure control with no video treatment.  The other four conditions 
each included a short video about UK-funded health clinics in Bangladesh. 6  All respondents in 
groups 2-5 were informed they would watch a video about a “British foreign aid project in 
Bangladesh.” All four videos featured a one-minute-long dramatization of the way in which pre-
natal services provided by a Smiling Sun Clinic calmed the anxieties of two soon-to-be-parents.  
In the control video treatment, the video included the Smiling Sun logo and name at the bottom 
of the screen but did not include any reference to UK aid or the UK.  
Treatments 3-5 featured “UK aid” branding: the UK aid logo and the tagline “From the British 
People” along the bottom of the video.  The branded video included this branding in lieu of the 
Smiling Sun logo and name.  The highlighted video features the branded video treatment plus a 
photo showing the UK aid logo on the main entrance of a clinic; it zoomed in on the logo for 
emphasis.  Text in the highlighted video said, “When the British Government funds projects like 
                                                          
5 A total of 1,107 respondents clicked on the initial survey link; 1,037 began the survey.  Fifty-two said that they 
were non-citizens and stopped; another 20 answered no questions after reporting citizenship.  Because of a 
programming error, 151 surveys terminated early and are excluded.   Another 19 individuals terminated the 
surveys early.  Eighteen respondents were unable to view the video and are excluded.   
6 Aid agency communications can take many forms, including brochures, Instagram pictures, or Tweets. We 
selected a video to allow respondents to engage with foreign-aid content for 60 seconds. DFID’s Communications 
Team reports investing considerable resources in video communications.  
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the Smiling Sun Clinics, they often require that the project show the ‘UKAID’ logo.” The strategic 
video included this and further information about the strategic value of credit-claiming: “The goal 
is to enhance the visibility of UKAID’s projects, to advance the UK’s other foreign policy goals, 
and to improve the UK’s image in Bangladesh.”   
Experimental Group Treatment Components 
 
Survey 
about 
Foreign Aid 
Aid Project 
Video  
 “UKAID 
From The 
British 
People” 
Banner  
Photo of 
Clinic with 
UKAID logo  
Information 
about 
Potential 
Strategic 
Benefits 
1) Pure Control X     
2) Control Video X X    
3) Branded Video X X X   
4) Highlighted Video X X X X  
5) Strategic Video X X X X X 
Table 1. Summary of Experimental Conditions.  “X” indicates that the condition included the 
component. 
Following all video treatments, we asked an initial question about aid delivery mechanisms 
and then asked one of our main outcome questions, “In your opinion, does the UK government 
do a good job of ensuring that our foreign aid is well spent by the countries that receive it?”  We 
then asked whether the government should “spend more, the same amount, or less money to 
help people in poor countries,” and questions about the usefulness of foreign aid and support 
for the UK government. For respondents in video conditions, we inquired whether the UK should 
increase its support of Smiling Sun Clinics, should fund similar projects elsewhere, and whether 
they thought that Bangladeshis were aware of UK funding for the clinics.  After demographic 
questions at the end of the survey, we included a manipulation check, asking respondents who 
were shown a video if they could name the project funder. 
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In the next section, we first present the manipulation checks.  We then look to see if there 
were effects on how respondents thought about aid effectiveness and on their levels of support 
for the particular development project featured in the video or foreign aid in general. 
We report the mean value of the outcome variables in each treatment condition.  We provide 
statistical tests for the comparisons between treatment and control conditions individually and 
a joint test for the three branded conditions.7  Our test statistics come from linear regressions 
that include indicators for all treatment conditions and subject pool indicators; we use robust 
standard errors to calculate p-values. 
For the findings related to aid effectiveness and support for aid, we also look, in accordance 
with our preregistered hypotheses, for heterogeneous treatment effects based on ideology.  
Respondents were asked to self-identify on a five-point ideology scale that ranged from “very 
left” (1) to “very right” (5); respondents could place themselves anywhere on the scale in 1/10 
point intervals.  The median self-placement in our sample was 2.5. Respondents at the midpoint 
or above are coded as “conservative”; below the midpoint as “liberal.”  
  All Conservative Liberal 
Pure Control 195 81 112 
Control Video 141 62 78 
Branded Video 146 59 83 
Highlighted Video 151 64 84 
Strategic Video 144 42 99 
Total 777 308 456 
 
Table 2: Respondents by Experimental Condition and Partisanship 
 
                                                          
7 The full set of comparisons are available in the online appendix.   
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Results 
 Table 3 presents the manipulation checks. Respondents who saw any of the branded videos 
were more likely to absorb information about UK funding.  Each treatment indicator is significant, 
as is a test of their joint significance.  In the highlighted video condition, an additional 35 percent 
of respondents name the UK as the funder; the proportion is somewhat lower in the strategic 
video condition and lower still in the video that simply has a static UK aid brand at the bottom.  
The survey provided other opportunities for respondents to infer UK involvement (e.g., the 
introduction to the videos or the question reported in the second column of the table): almost 
half of the group that saw the control video correctly answered that the project is UK-funded.  
Even so, the evidence suggests that branding accomplishes one of its missions: it communicates 
to a broader donor country audience that a development intervention has been funded using 
government resources.   
 The second column of Table 3 shows that branding leads people to infer that individuals in 
aid-receiving countries are aware of the aid’s source.  In the control video condition, only one of 
four respondents thinks that Bangladeshis are informed about the origins of the funding for the 
clinics.  This jumps by 20 percentage points in the branded video condition and by around 20 
percentage points more in the remaining two conditions.   
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 Proportion Naming 
the UK as the Funder 
of the Smiling Sun 
Clinics 
Proportion Saying 
that People in 
Bangladesh Know 
about UK Funding 
Control Video 0.48 0.26 
Branded Video 0.70 0.48 
Highlighted Video 0.83 0.65 
Strategic Video 0.76 0.69 
p-value from chi-squared 
test 
0.001 0.001 
Regression-Based 
Comparisons  
  
Branded Video 0.22*** 0.22*** 
 (0.057) (0.056) 
Highlighted Video 0.35*** 0.40*** 
 (0.052) (0.054) 
Strategic video 0.28*** 0.44*** 
 (0.055) (0.053) 
   
Observations 582 577 
R-Squared 0.082 0.123 
Joint significance test for 
treatment indicators 
F = 15.88 F = 27.87 
Prob > F = 0.00 Prob > F = 0.00 
   
Table 3.  Awareness of UK Aid.  Top panel presents means of the four video treatment conditions.  
Middle panel presents the p-value for a χ2 test of H0: independence of treatment conditions from 
responses to question.  Bottom panel presents regression coefficients for the treatment 
indicators in a regression with subject pool fixed effects (not reported); robust standard errors in 
parentheses. *** - p < 0.01; ** - p < 0.05; * - p < 0.10.  
 
Does seeing aid branding in action change respondents perceptions of foreign aid? Table 4 
provides evidence that observing branding in action through the highlighted or strategic videos 
yields more positive assessments of how the UK uses its aid.  Willingness to agree with the 
statement that the UK does a “good job of ensuring that aid is well spent” increased by at least a 
quarter of a point on a five-point scale.  
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 “UK does a good job of ensuring that foreign aid is well spent” (1…5) 
 All Conservative Liberal 
Pure Control 2.90 2.95 2.87 
Control Video 2.98 2.92 3.01 
Branded Video 2.91 2.80 2.96 
Highlighted Video 3.14 3.23 3.05 
Strategic Video 3.18 3.05 3.24 
p-value from chi-squared 
test 
0.191 0.091 0.244 
Regression-Based Comparisons  
Pure Control  -0.08 0.03 -0.15 
 (0.100) (0.151) (0.134) 
Branded Video -0.06 -0.10 -0.05 
 (0.110) (0.179) (0.141) 
Highlighted Video 0.16 0.33** 0.03 
 (0.106) (0.165) (0.139) 
Strategic Video 0.21** 0.14 0.23* 
 (0.105) (0.187) (0.132) 
    
Observations 777 308 456 
R-squared 0.025 0.042 0.026 
Joint significance test for 
treatment indicators 
F = 3.37 
Prob > F = 0.01 
F = 1.82 
Prob > F = 0.126 
F  = 2.69 
Prob > F = 0.031 
Table 4.  Perceptions of UK Aid Quality.  Top panel presents means for the five experimental 
conditions.  Middle panel presents p-value for a χ2 test of H0: independence of treatment 
conditions from responses.  Bottom panel presents regression coefficients for treatment 
indicators in a regression with subject pool fixed effects; control video is the omitted condition; 
robust standard errors in parentheses. *** - p < 0.01; ** - p < 0.05; * - p < 0.10. 
 
Does seeing branding in action change respondents’ general attitudes toward foreign aid?  In 
Table 5, we look at two outcomes related to the development intervention in the video and one 
related to attitudes toward overall levels of foreign assistance. In the overall sample, we see small 
and insignificant effects of the branded videos for each of the three outcomes. In each case, 
however, we also see that there is lower support for foreign aid among conservatives in the 
control conditions (i.e., the pure control condition and the control video condition). Among 
conservative respondents, exposure to the highlighted branding condition made them about a 
quarter-point more likely (on a five-point scale) to say that the UK should increase its support for 
the Smiling Sun Clinics in Bangladesh and about 15 percentage points more likely to say that the 
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UK should support similar projects in other countries.  Oddly, liberals exposed to the highlighted 
video are less supportive of allocating assistance to the Smiling Sun Clinics in Bangladesh relative 
to liberals who saw the control video.  If liberals are critical of using aid to promote the donor 
image, the highlighted video treatment might evoke negative feelings towards aid, particularly 
absent explanation for the UKaid logo on a health clinic in Bangladesh.  
The third outcome variable in Table 5 presents some surprises, and suggests that information 
about aid moves respondent opinions in a negative direction. Respondents in a pure control 
group that saw no video were more likely to support foreign aid spending overall.  This is 
particularly pronounced among conservatives. 
Our central hypotheses were preregistered, and we provide joint significance tests on the 
treatment indicators, yet there is a potential for false discoveries because of the multiple 
treatment indicators and the clustering of outcome variables. The Holm-Bonferroni adjustment 
creates a stricter standard for declaring findings statistically significant. 8  In Table 3, we examine 
three treatment indicators across two outcome variables from the same family: given the small 
standard errors, all findings retain conventional levels of statistical significance after the 
correction.  In Table 4, we have a single outcome variable with four treatment indicators 
examined across three subsets of the data.  In Table 5, we have three outcome variables with 
either three or four treatment indicators, each examined across three subsets of the data.  All 
adjusted p-values for both Tables 4 and 5 are above the standard critical value of p < 0.05. 
                                                          
8 Note that this is one of several contested methods for adjusting for multiple comparisons.  
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 “To what extent should the UK increase its 
support for SSCs?” (1…5) 
“Should the UK fund projects like the SSCs in 
other countries?” (0/1) 
“Should the government spend more, the same 
amount, or less money to help people in poor 
countries?” (1…3) 
 All Conservative Liberal All Conservative Liberal All Conservative Liberal 
Pure Control       2.53 2.32 2.69 
Control Video 3.50 3.16 3.76 0.82 0.71 0.91 2.39 2.10 2.62 
Branded Video 3.45 3.22 3.61 0.85 0.71 0.94 2.45 2.14 2.67 
Highlighted Video 3.51 3.44 3.56 0.88 0.84 0.92 2.46 2.28 2.60 
Strategic Video 3.54 3.29 3.65 0.88 0.71 0.94 2.51 2.17 2.66 
p-value from chi-
squared test 
0.799 0.757 0.612 0.506 0.234 0.829 0.816 0.590 0.561 
Regression-Based 
Comparisons  
         
          
Pure Control       0.15* 0.25** 0.07 
       (0.079) (0.125) (0.095) 
Branded Video -0.05 0.07 -0.14 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.06 0.03 0.05 
 (0.098) (0.162) (0.112) (0.044) (0.084) (0.042) (0.085) (0.133) (0.101) 
Highlighted Video 0.02 0.28* -0.20* 0.06 0.15** 0.01 0.07 0.20 -0.03 
 (0.096) (0.148) (0.117) (0.042) (0.073) (0.044) (0.085) (0.138) (0.102) 
Strategic Video 0.04 0.13 -0.11 0.05 0.01 0.03 0.12 0.08 0.04 
 (0.100) (0.172) (0.115) (0.043) (0.091) (0.040) (0.085) (0.152) (0.096) 
          
Observations 577 227 344 577 227 344 777 308 456 
R-squared 0.009 0.018 0.040 0.011 0.044 0.007 0.026 0.043 0.018 
Joint significance 
test for treatment 
indicators 
F = 0.37 
Prob>F=0.78 
F = 1.33 
  Prob>F=0.27 
F = 1.04 
Prob>F=0.37 
F = 0.82 
Prob>F=0.48 
F = 2.18 
Prob>F=0.09 
F = 0.72            
Prob>F=0.54 
F = 0.72 
Prob>F=0.54 
F = 0.88            
Prob>F=0.45 
F = 0.32            
Prob>F=0.81 
Table 5.  Support for Foreign Aid.  See notes for previous table. 
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Conclusion 
 Branding development interventions can convey information to multiple audiences.  On the 
one hand, branding speaks to those who benefit from the project, ostensibly in an attempt to 
improve attitudes toward donor countries.  At the same time, branding shows political elites and 
taxpayers in the donor country how their resources are being used.  Whether these efforts work 
as expected is largely an untested proposition. 
 We evaluate UK citizens’ reactions to foreign assistance branding. This research is exploratory 
and will inform future research.  Our findings contribute knowledge to research that asks 
whether existing attitudes about foreign aid can be changed (e.g., Nair 2018; Scotto et al. 2017). 
First, we show that branding used in communications with donor publics succeeds in conveying 
information to respondents: subjects who watched a video featuring branded aid were more 
likely to know that the project had been funded by the UK than those who watched the 
unbranded video.  In addition, these respondents were more likely to infer awareness of the 
donor among people in Bangladesh. Secondly, our findings show that branding changes attitudes 
towards foreign aid: it improves perceptions that foreign aid is well spent.  
Our study also contributes to research on how ideology shapes support for foreign aid (e.g. 
Fleck and Kilby 2006; Mawdsley 2017). We find that branding increases support among 
conservative respondents for expanding the intervention as featured in the video. This finding 
supports recent evidence suggesting that conservative and left-leaning parties may value aid for 
different reasons: while the left supports aid for more altruistic, development-oriented reasons, 
conservatives support foreign aid when it pursues the national interest, e.g. by promoting the 
image of the donor abroad.  
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Further, our result that branding improves perceptions about the UK`s ability to ensure that 
aid is well spent directly relates to findings from the literature on credit-claiming, which contends 
that legislators reap electoral benefits not only for allocating benefits but also for taking credit 
for their actions (Stein and Bickers 1994). More recently, research has found that credit-claiming 
messages improve perceptions about the ability of U.S. legislators to deliver spending and 
projects to their district (e.g. Grimmer, Messing, and Westwood 2012). Our findings show that 
the U.K. government`s decision to claim credit for development interventions can be successful: 
it increases information about who funds the intervention and improves perceptions about the 
U.K.`s ability to deliver foreign aid effectively. It also increases support for aid on the domestic 
front, although it does not work uniformly.   
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